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Questions On Israel
Chomsky responses in The ZNet Forum System
by Noam
Chomsky
ZNet Sustainer Program
June 30, 2002
As a premium to those who support Z
through the Z Sustainer Program there are a number of forums where people can
ask questions of activists and writers such as Noam Chomsky. Here are Chomsky's
responses to questions about Israel And Palestine during the last week. If you
find these helpful consider joining.
Bush, Arafat And Reform
President Bush has called, in an
open display of blackmail, for the Palestinians to replace Yasser Arafat as
their leader and to institute "reform" of the Palestinian Authority.
Given that when Arafat was signing on the dotted line the "international
community" cared little for the corrupt nature of Arafat's rule it can be
surmised that Washington wants to replace Arafat with a Marshal Petain and to
bring into existence a vichy Palestine. However, to speculate, could it be
possible that Israel and Washington are trying to provoke a civil war in
Palestine liked they tried to do when they supported Islamic fundamentalism as
a force against secular Arab nationalism? Could this be a pretext for permanent
occupation?
I'm assuming that by the phrase
"international community" (in quotes) you mean to refer with
appropriate irony to the US and any clients who will go along -- the standard
way in which the term is used in contemporary Newspeak.
If so, you're entirely right about
the international community and Arafat's Palestinian Authority. As long as they
controlled the Palestinian population, with whatever violence and repression it
took, no one cared whether they lived in luxury in Gaza high rises and
cooperated with Israeli counterparts in crushing the miserable population.
Arafat became "part of the problem" only when he lost control, and
the people who matter lost their monopoly of violence and terror, how holding
just a substantial preponderance. It's much the same as the elite reaction to
9-11 in the West.
So he has to be replaced by another
figure who can perform the assigned task.
I doubt that Israel wants permanent
occupation. Too costly, and inefficient. Bantustans are a better model. Barak's
chief negotiator, the respected dove Shlomo Ben-Ami, explained some years ago
that the goal of the Oslo process is to establish a "neocolonial
dependency" for the Palestinians, which will be "permanent." If
Arafat and his clique can't manage that, others will have to be found to serve
the masters properly.
Also the newly set up world court in
the Hague the ICC, one would think, should have oversight over this conflict.
Could it be possible that one way of getting rid of Arafat would be to indict
him for war crimes, ie to accuse him as a terrorist? Imagine if the ICC were to
indict both Sharon and Arafat. Anybody can arrest Arafat but who would arrest
Sharon? Does this point out a flaw in the ICC concept in that only those
criminals who the "international community" wants to arrest will be
arrested because only they have the power of arrest...they will not arrest
themselves?
As for the ICC, it has the same flaw
as all international institutions. In a world ruled by force, the rich and
powerful do pretty much what they like. It's next to inconceivable that the ICC
could try, even investigate, Western criminals. Simply look what happened to
the World Court and the Security Council when they tried to get the US to call
off its terrorist war against Nicaragua. The same was true of Nuremberg. The
people sentenced there were some of the worst gangsters in human history, no
doubt, but the operational definition of "war crime" was "war
crime that they committed and we did not." And despite Justice Robert
Jackson's fine words about how the Nuremberg principles must apply universally,
the US and its allies remained immune when they duplicated many of the crimes
in subsequent years, because they are far too powerful to touch, and because
the educated classes are sufficiently obedient to cover their tracks.
Peace Proposal
The NYT says that Arafat just
accepted the no longer relevant Camp David peace offer--the NYT went on to say
this was the most generous offer ever made by Israel and that Arafat rejected
it nearly two years ago. That would mean the summer 2000 offer, rather than the
more generous January 2001 offer. Clearly the NYT is wrong to describe the
summer 2000 offer as the most generous, when Israel went further in January
2001. I pointed this out to them. My question is this--which offer did Arafat
claim he was willing to accept? Did he actually express a willingness to accept
a less generous offer than the one made in Taba, or is the NYT simply lying?
And also, did Arafat reject the Taba offer or did Israel quit negotiating
because of the upcoming elections?
Just to clarify, there was no
Israeli offer in Jan. 2001. These (Taba) meetings were informal. Proposals were
made, but nothing official. There is a very good record of what happened by the
EU observer, validated by both sides, published in the Israeli press. There had
been considerable progress since Camp David towards a reasonable settlement,
though there were still substantial differences. Israel broke off the meetings,
presumably because of the upcoming elections. My own view, for what it is
worth, was (then, and even more so in retrospect), that the Palestinian
leadership would have been well advised to put substantial energy into
publicizing the tentative results at Taba, internationally and to their own
people, and to try to use that as a basis for further negotiation, avoiding
provocation and violence.
It's not even clear what the Camp
David 2000 offer was, or even whether there was one, officially. The US
produced no formal position. Israel made several proposals, but it's not clear
how official they were, or even exactly what they were. Maps were published in
Israel, and here, but unofficially. It's rather striking that the media and
journals here apparently published no maps -- at least, none I've been able to
locate -- though it's perfectly obvious that to evaluate the offer and its
much-hailed "magnanimity" and "generosity," one has to look
at a map and see what is actually being proposed. I presume that that lapse was
not accidental. A mere look at the maps that do exist (which are consistent)
reveals that the offer hardly merited such terms.
The Times report was unclear, and it
is likely that Arafat didn't say anything very definite or meaningful. Under
his current circumstances, it's hard to see how he could.
Gunnar Jarring Proposal, Egypt and
Sadat
I took an interest into researching
the facts of the largely unknown (at least in the US) peace initiative by
Gunnar Jarring and the responses of both Egypt and Israel. I was able to get a
copy of the three major documents, as well as a relevant discussion from
Rabin's memoirs (191-195). I know that you are one of the few analysts to
actually make note of such an event in history (interestingly my college
textbook for world history noted the event briefly as well), so I was wondering
if you could help me clear up a couple of questions with regard to the issue of
the pre-June 1967 borders. As you probably know, Jarring's Aide Memoire asks
Israel among other things to withdraw from conquered Egypt territory to the
"international boundary," and asks Egypt to end hostilities and
recognize Israel's existence. Egypt agreed to each point, although adding at
the end of its reply that "just and lasting peace cannot be realized
without ... the withdrawal [from all occupied territories]." Does this
mean that Egypt was only agreeing to peace on the condition that Israel adhere
to the international consensus? I don't see that Jarring's proposal says
anything about full withdrawal as a commitment, although he mentions a
"settlement in accordance" with UN 242, interpreted differently by
Israel over the rest of the world. Which leads me to the question with regard
to Israel's response. You have stated in _Fateful Triangle_ among other places,
that Israel's response was a flat rejection of the proposal with no
counteroffer, but on the surface it seems like Israel agreed to all the points
of the Jarring initiative. In point 4--probably the most significant in the
response--Israel agreed to "give undertakings" covering the
withdrawal "from the Israel-UAR cease-fire line to the secure, recognized
and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not
withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines." Rabin's memoirs note that he, as
well as Washington officials were disappointed with Israel's response, which
Rabin described as "rambling [with] long-windedness [and] exceeded only by
its vagueness." I am probably missing something, but wasn't point 4
accepting the terms of the initiative, while rejecting an element Rabin called
the "conditional link"? If so, why did the Jarring initiative
"[fade] away into history?
In Feb. 1971, Gunnar Jarring drew up
a specific plan, which he submitted to Egypt and Israel. It called for full
peace between Egypt and Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal to the
internationally-recognized border (the pre-June 1967 border). President Sadat
of Egypt accepted it without qualification. Israel considered it, recognized it
to be a genuine peace offer (as Rabin's memoirs and much other evidence makes
clear; note that Rabin's objections, as illustrated in the comments you quote,
were tactical, not substantive). In internal discussion, it was recognized that
if Israel accepted the offer there could be peace, but at the cost of
territorial expansion into the Sinai, which was a high priority for the
then-governing Israeli labor Party. Israel therefore decided to reject Jarring's
offer, stating that it would not withdraw to the pre-June 1967 border. That
effectively concluded Jarring's mission.
Israel then proceeded with its plans
to settle northeastern Sinai (the "Galili Protocols"), brutally
expelling 10,000 farmers and Bedouins, driving them into the desert, destroying
their villages, mosques, cemeteries,..., and proceeding to build the all-Jewish
city of Yamit. This was one of Sharon's major atrocities (carried out, like
many of his other crimes, under the leadership of the Labor government). Sadat
warned that "Yamit means war," and when the US and Israel dismissed
him with contempt, did finally go to war in 1973 -- not an attack on Israel, as
claimed in much propaganda, but on his own territory conquered by Israel and
held with US backing after he had offered a full peace treaty, with no
conditions.
The fact that Egypt said that a
"just and lasting peace" would require withdrawal from all
territories (in accord with UN 242, as accepted by virtually the entire world,
including the US at that time) is not relevant. It was not a condition on
Egypt's acceptance of Jarring's memorandum, nor was it the reason for Israel's
rejection of them, as the facts just mentioned (discussed in "Fateful
Triangle" and elsewhere) make evident. Your statement that "on the
surface it seems like Israel agreed to all the points of the Jarring
initiative" is also incorrect, as shown by the words of Israel's official
response that you quote: Israel will withdraw "to the secure, recognized
and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement" but not --
repeat NOT -- to "the pre-June 5, 1967 lines."
I hope that clears up the confusion.
The documentary evidence is explicit and unambiguous: Sadat made no condition,
and Israel explicitly rejected Sadat's offer (namely, his unconditional
acceptance of the Jarring proposal).
As to why the incident faded from
history, that's straightforward. The US backed Israel's rejection of peace.
Therefore the incident cannot remain within history. There was a good illustration
a few weeks ago when Jarring died. There were, of course, many obituaries.
David Peterson did a media search. With one exception (the Los Angeles Times,
reprinted in the Boston Globe), the press simply avoided the most important
political event in his career, namely the one we are discussing. The LAT and BG
did mention it, but falsified it, claiming that both Israel and the Arab states
rejected his proposal. That is quite normal when the US undermines the
prospects for peace. In this case, the scholarly record is often disgraceful as
well; I've given a number of examples in print.
The facts are as stated in
"Fateful Triangle" and elsewhere, based on these documents. I don't
see any ambiguity.
We should also bear in mind that
Jarring's proposal, and Egypt's response, were 100% rejectionist: there is no
recognition of any Palestinian right of self-determination (as in UN 242), a
position that we would call "racist," maybe a reversion to Nazism, if
the shoe were on the other foot. Without further comment, that tells us a lot
about the intellectual and moral culture, highly pertinent today, in the light
of the shameful speech that Bush's speech-writers just had him read, and the
reaction to it.
I have one more technical question
regarding semantics, and would be obliged if you could answer it. You said
Jarring's phrase, "the international boundary between Egypt and the
British mandate for Palestine," was the pre-June 1967 border. It seems to
include the Gaza strip as Egypt's reply makes clear, but wasn't Gaza not a part
of Egypt in the British mandate for Palestine (Balfour if I'm not mistaken)?
It's a good question, and I don't
think it has a clear answer. Gaza was part of Palestine under the League of
Nations Mandate. It was taken over by Egypt in the 1948 war, but as far as I
recall, not officially annexed. Its status remained somewhat ambiguous, though
the international border (Green Line) leaves Gaza within Palestine, not Egypt.
Egypt's reactions to Israel's actions in Gaza and Northeast Sinai were quite
different. It may have complained about atrocities and development in Gaza, but
not very seriously as I recall. However, when the Golda Meir Labor government
began to settle northeast Sinai, and Sharon carried out major atrocities there
under government orders, the Egyptian reaction was very different: a warning
that Egypt would go to war, as it did (to everyone's surprise and shock, given
the prevailing racist assumptions).
I meant to ask you a question about
the 1977 proposal as well. Sorry for the extra message. Anyway, since you say
that the reason Sadat was accepted as a man of peace in 1977 because he could
"conform to US intentions" at the time, do you think that Sadat could
have been made to conform in 1971 if the US knew of Egypt's military power? Do
you know where I can find more information on US intentions with regard to the
1971 initiative? I plan to look at the Foreign Relations of the United States
and Kissinger's memoirs among other places. Thanks again.
I don't quite understand your point.
There is no issue of "making Egypt conform."
In 1977 Sadat repeated his 1971
offer, but this time adding further conditions: that a Palestinian state be
established in the Israeli-occupied territories; that was a reflection of an
important shift in the international consensus, abandoning earlier rejectionism
(the US and Israel aside). For his 1977 offer, Sadat is hailed in the official
story as a great "man of peace." His 1971 offer, much closer to
US-Israel demands, has been expunged from the record. The reason is that the
US-Israel position had changed. The 1967-73 period was one of extreme
triumphalism, tinged with more than a little racism. The facts are well
described in a book by the important Israeli correspondent Amnon Kapeliouk on
the period, which I have quoted in this connection; I might add that I and some
others attempted to find an American publisher for the book (in Hebrew,
translated into French), but in vain; it was the wrong story. Under the
assumption that Egypt was a basket case, Israel and Kissinger felt that they
could simply disregard Egypt. The 1973 war turned out to be a close thing, and
almost led to nuclear war. That lifted the clouds even for Kissinger. The US
and Israel then turned to the natural back-up strategy: to remove Egypt from
the conflict, so that Israel could then proceed, with US support, to integrate
the occupied territories and attack Lebanon.
There was no question of
"making Egypt conform" in 1971. The problem was "making the US
conform." In 1971, the US-Israel rejected Sadat's offer of peace in return
for withdrawal from Egyptian territory. In 1977, they accepted it (while
rejecting his new condition concerning a Palestinian state). The reason is
their recognition that Egypt could not simply be disregarded, and therefore had
to be neutralized if essentially the same plans were to proceed. Incidentally,
it is not clear that Carter understood much of this; probably not, in fact,
though it was pretty obvious, and is explicit in mainstream Israeli commentary
(and dissident commentary here).
Internal documents on the 1971
period have not yet been released. Kissinger did state his reasons. They are
quoted in "Fateful Triangle" (p. 65), and in more detail, in my
review of his memoirs, reprinted in "Towards a New Cold War." They
reveal such embarrassing stupidity and ignorance of elementary facts of
international affairs that they are ignored in the scholarly record on
Kissinger, with very rare exceptions. From the evidence currently available, it
appears that the US government was divided on Sadat's initiative. Secretary of
State Rogers apparently favored support for it (it conformed closely to the
official US Rogers plan). Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, preferred
what he called "stalemate." He seems to have won the internal
bureaucratic battle. As for his reasons, one can only conjecture. It seems
likely that they had to do mostly with his attempt to undermine Rogers and take
over complete control over foreign policy. That's intimated by David Korn, in
an insider's account, and is suggested by the utter foolishness of Kissinger's
memoirs, in this connection (which is not unique; see the review mentioned).
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